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NOTES AND COMMENTS
AMENDMENT OF PLEADINGS AFTER TRIAL
Wide latitude in the making of amendments to pleadings, before
and after trial, and even after judgment, appears to be the aim of
Section 46 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act.' It purports to carry out the
policy expressed in another section to the effect that controversies should
be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights
of the parties.2 To such a policy most litigants and lawyers would heartily subscribe, but efforts to liberalize procedure so as to permit a prompt
decision on the merits seem to have received a limitation in Bollaert
v. Kankakee Tile & Brick Company.3 It was there decided that the
right to amend after judgment 'was contrary to other recognized principles affecting the jurisdiction of our courts, and, to the extent that
conflict existed, the right to amend was forced to yield.
In that case an employee sued for money allegedly due, basing his
claim on the theory of an account stated. The proof adduced at the
trial, without a jury, did not support that theory though it did justify
a recovery on another basis. Judgment for the plaintiff was, therefore,
granted. The defendant employer filed a notice of appeal and duly followed such notice with an appeal bond which received judicial approval.
In the interim between notice of appeal and the approval of the bond,
plaintiff filed a notice of cross-appeal and a motion for leave to amend
his complaint. His motion was allowed by the trial judge on the ground
that the purpose of the amendment was to conform the pleadings to
the proof, hence within the scope of Section 46 of the Civil Practice
Act. The Appellate Court, Second District, however held that such amendment had been improperly granted because, by reason of the steps taken toward the appeal, the trial court4 had lost jurisdiction of the cause.
It therefore reversed and remanded.
It is fundamental that one suit can be pending only in one court at
one moment of time, hence jurisdiction to decide cannot exist at the
same time in a trial court and also in a reviewing court. Necessarily,
the rule must be that once an appeal is perfected and the reviewing
court has obtained jurisdiction of a case, such jurisdiction can no longer
reside in the lower court. Such, indeed, was the rule at common law,
1 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 170.
2 Ibid., § 128.
a 317 Ill. App. 120, 45 N.E. (2d) 506 (1942). The decision might seem to be in
conflict with Grossman v. Grossman, 312 Ill. App. 655, 38 N.E. (2d) 778 (1942),
abstract opinion, wherein the reviewing court sanctioned the allowance, by the
lower court, of an amendment to the complaint to conform to proof while an
appeal was pending. An examination of the opinion disclosed that the appeal
was only from an interlocutory order concerning injunction and receivership.
4 Dove, J., dissented on the ground that Section 46(3) of the statute in question
expressly covered amendment after judgment.
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though a distinction was made between an appeal and a writ of error.
The former was merely a continuation of the same proceeding, while
the latter was considered as an independent legal proceeding originating from the upper court. The latter did not, therefore, of itself divest
the lower court of its jurisdiction. 5 When an appeal was taken, the
lower court had to make up the record and, that work not being a part
of the judicial determination of the merits of the case, the lower court
still had power, or jurisdiction, to do so. Such jurisdiction over the
record, as distinguished from over the controversy, has not been modified by practice statutes and seems inherent to the functioning of a
court. During the process of making out the record, corrections might
6
be made therein, by the trial court, of any clerical mistakes, especially upon proper notice to the parties, so that the record might
7
speak the truth and represent what had actually occurred. Other
amendment, however, particularly one affecting the merits of the controversy, was improper.
Prior to the enactment of the Civil Practice Act, Illinois consistently followed these common-law rules. All proceedings were stayed
8
in the lower court upon perfection of the appeal. Matters purely of
form could still be corrected below, and the reviewing court would
accept the filing of a supplemental record. 9 Such supplemental records, however, were only acceptable to the extent that they showed
what had actually taken place before the time of perfecting the appeal,10 and, if the appeal was from a specific order, such as the appoint5 This distinction was carefully observed in Illinois until changed by the Practice Act; it is well set out and concisely expressed in Thompson v. Davis,
297 Il. 11 at p. 15, 130 N.E. 455 at p. 457 (1921).
6 Collins vs. Nelson, 41 Cal App. (2d) 107, 106 P. (2d) 39 (1940); O'Hare v.
Peacock Dairies, Inc., 39 Cal. App. (2d) 506, 103 P. (2d) 594 (1940); In re Schultz,
99 Cal. App. 134, 277 P. 1049 (1929); Haynes v. Los Angeles By. Corporation,
80 Cal. App. 776, 252 P. 1072 (1927); Miracle v. Marshall, 271 Ky. 18, 111 S.W.
(2d) 399 (1937); Higdon v. Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 69, 77 S.W. (2d) 400 (1934);
Smart v. Valencia, 49 Nev. 411, 248 P. 46 (1926).
7 Hilliker v. Board of Trustees, 91 Cal. App. 521, 267 P. 367 (1928); Cranston
v. Stanfield, 123 Ore. 314, 261 P. 52 (1927); Panhandle Const. Co. v. Lindsey,
123 Tex. 613, 72 S.W. (2d) 1068 (1934); Milwaukee Electric Crane & Mfg. Corp.
v. Feil Mfg. Co., 201 Wis. 494, 230 N.W. 607 (1930). This power extends to amandment of a sheriff's return: Palatine Ins. Co. v. Hill, 219 Ala. 123, 121 So. 412
(1929); to amendment of the minutes: Phoenix Title & Trust Co. v. Horwath.
41 Ariz. 417, 19 P. (2d) 82 (1933); to amendments in the pleadings: Centennial
Mill Co. v. Martinov, 83 Utah 391, 28 P. (2d) 602 (1934), Dwight v. Hazlett,
107 W. Va. 192, 147 S.E. 877 (1929); or even in the judgment: Vaughn v. Kansas
City Gas Co., (Kan. App.) 159 S.W. (2d) 690 (1942), Michael McNamara Varnish
Works v. McNamara Paint Prod. Co., 286 Mich. 68, 281 N.W. 540 (1938), Crawford v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 171 Mo. 68, 66 S.W. 350 (1902), Mills v.
Moore, (Tex. Civ. App.) 5 S.W. (2d) 263 (1928), and Hovey v. McDonald, 109
U.S. 150, 3 S. Ct. 136, 27 L. Ed. 888 (1883). A list of acts still permitted in the
lower court pending appeal is set out in State ex rel. Riefling v. Sale, 153 Mo.
App. 273, 133 S.W. 119 at p. 121 (1910).
8 People ex rel. Beadles v. Parn, 276 Ill. 181, 114 N.E. 504 (1916).
9 Cook County Brick Co. v. Win. Bach & Sons Co., 93 Ill. App. 88 (1901).
10 Ogden v. Town of Lake View, 121 Ill. 422, 13 N.E. 159 (1887).
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ment of a receiver or the issuance of a temporary injunction, the reviewing court would disregard anything which had happened in any
other aspect of the case subsequently to the entry thereof." At the
same time it also became the practice, confirmed early by statute, to
allow amendment of pleadings in the trial court so as to conform to
the proofs. Thus, in chancery cases, amendment was possible at any
time until the close of the term following the decree if the decree was
rendered in vacation. 12 Similarly, in law cases, amendment even after
verdict was permitted, provided such action was taken prior to judgment. s Allowance of an amendment to the pleadings was, however,
subject to the discretion of the court and might be denied in a proper
case. 14 Amendments were never allowed after the appeal had been
perfected, 15 and an appeal, for the purpose of jurisdiction, matured
at once the finality of the judgment appealed from. 16
Apparently with these ideas in mind, Section 46 of the Civil Practice Act was drafted to permit amendments to the pleadings, for the
sole purpose of making the same conform to the proofs, either before
or after judgment, upon such terms as might be deemed just and
without any apparent qualification that such amendment was necessary
before appeal had been taken. In fact another section was inserted
permitting the reviewing court to exercise any and all of the powers
17
of amendment which might have been exercised by the trial court.
The same statute, however, contains a provision, not found in the
earlier statutes, which recites that: "An appeal shall be deemed perfected when the notice of appeal shall be filed in the lower court . . .
no step other than that by which the appeal is perfected shall be
deemed jurisdictional.' u8 Jurisdiction is thereby vested in the reviewing court sooner than was formerly the case, with a corresponding
limitation on the .powers of the trial court. That section, operating
through the principles laid down in earlier cases, was regarded as
sufficient in the Bollaert case to limit the right to amend the pleadings, at least in the trial court, up until the time when notice of appeal
was filed. Though amendment, even after judgment, is permitted by the
statute and has been approved by the courts,' 9 such permission must
now be exercised in the light of this additional requirement.
The broad language of Section 46 may, then, develop into a trap
11 Martin v. Sexton, 72 Ill.
App. 395 (1897).
12 Cooper v. Gum, 152 Ill.
471, 39 N.E. 267 (1894).
's Kennedy v. Swift & Co., 234 Ill.
606, 85 N.E. 287 (1908).
14 Wolverton v. George H. Taylor & Co., 157 Ill.
485, 42 N.E. 49 (1895).
15 Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co.,
100 Ill.
21 (1881); Parker v. Shannon, 121 Ill.
452, 13 N.E. 155 (1887).
16 Elgin Lumber Co. v. Langman and Utman, 23 Ill.
App. 250 (1887).
17 ll. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 216(a).
18 Ibid., § 200(2). See also Francke v. Eadie, 373 Il. 500, 26 N.E. (2d) 853
(1940), noted in 18 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REviEw 416.

19 Wiedow v. Carpenter, 310 Ill.
App. 342, 34 N.E. (2d) 83 (1941); Jackson v.
Jackson, 294 Ill.
App. 552, 14 N.E. (2d) 271 (1938).
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for the unwary if the lesson of the Bollaert case is overlooked. Too
much reliance on the provision permitting amendment in the reviewing
court after appeal has been taken would likewise seem unwise. Decisions exist which have declared other portions of that section unconstitutional as an attempt to confer upon reviewing courts powers not
properly belonging to appellate tribunals. 20 Such decisions, while not
strictly in point, cast grave doubts upon the validity of the provision
in question for the reasoning therein involved would seem equally applicable to the instant situation.
With the opportunity to amend lost in the trial court by the prompt
filing of a notice of appeal, and with no apparently sound relief available in the reviewing court, a stalemate appears likely. The only avenue of escape, followed in the Bollaert case, seems to be for the reviewing court to reverse and remand the cause upon the existing record.
This, however, forces the parties to the expense and delay of a new
trial, a consequence which appears to be a definite restriction upon
the policy motivating our reformed procedure.
G. MAscmFNoT

CIVIL PRACTICE ACT CASES
APPF AL AND ERoR-RECORD AND PROCEEDINGS NOT IN REcoD--WHErHE
T iAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION, AFTER EXPIRATION OF TIME ALLOWED By RULEs
OF COURT IN WICH TO PREPARE AND FILE REcORD, To GRANT ExTENSION OF
TIME TO APPELLANT FOR sucH PuRPosE-In the divorce case of Lukas v.

Lukas,' the defendant filed notice of appeal from an adverse decree.
Within the fifty-day period allowed by Rule 36(1), subsection (c), of the
Illinois Supreme Court, 2 the appellant prepared and submitted a report
of the proceedings to the trial judge, but, for some unexplained reason,
the same was not then filed. One week after the fifty-day period had
expired, appellant secured an order extending the time in which to file
such report of proceedings which order was entered nunc pro tunc as
of the day on which the report had been presented. The report was thereafter duly filed and the record submitted to the reviewing court. Upon
its own motion, that court refused to consider the report of the proceedings on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter
the order in question, and, finding no error in the remainder of the
record, it affirmed the decree.
20 Schmidt v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 376 Ill. 183, 33 N.E. (2d) 485 (1941),
as applied to the Illinois Supreme Court; Ockenga v. Alken, 314 Ill. App. 389.
41 N.E. (2d) 548 (1942), as applied to the Appellate Courts. See also Sprague v.
Goodrich, 376 IIl. 80, 32 N.E. (2d) 897 (1941), noted in 19 CHICAGO-KENT LAw
REViEw 275, and Scott v. Freeport Motor Casualty Co., 379 Ill. 155, 39 N.E. (2d)
999 (1942), noted in 21 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REvIEw 35, which cases deal with a
similar problem under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 192(3c).
1 381 Ill. 429, 45 N.E. (2d) 869 (1943), Wilson, J., dissented without opinion.
Appeal to the Supreme Court was allowed because a freehold was involved.
2 111. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.36.
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The filing of the notice of appeal in any case is important, not only
from its jurisdictional aspects, s but also from the fact that it is the controlling date fixing the time for subsequent steps to be taken in perfecting
the appeal. 4 In recognition of the fact that it is not always possible to
complete the required steps in the allotted time, provision has been made
for the entry of an order extending the time, but where such provision
exists it is accompanied by the qualification that any such order be
entered before the allotted period has expired.5 The trial court in the
instant case, despite this qualification, attempted to give its order retroactive effect by providing that the same was entered nunc pro tunc as of
a date within the period in which, had application then been made, it
might have granted an extension of time. Such conduct has received the
condemnation of the Illinois Supreme Court in criminal cases and also
in civil cases decided prior to the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice
Act.7 By regarding such order as a nullity in the instant case, the
court again affirms this earlier position. To be valid, therefore, any
order granting an extension of time must be entered in fact and within the allotted period.
It should also be noted that the mere presentation or submission of
the report of proceedings to the trial judge, though done within apt time,
is not a sufficient compliance with the rule in question. That rule, having
the force of statute,8 specifically states that: "The report of the proceedings at the trial . . . shall be procured by the appellant and submitted to the trial judge ... and filed in the trial court within 50 days after
the appeal has been perfected." 9 Nothing short of filing is regarded as
compliance therewith,' 0 and, if the filing does not occur within the limited
3 Ibid., § 200(2).
4 Thus, it is made the basis for measuring time, under Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941,
Ch. 110, § 259.34, in which to serve notice of appeal and to file return thereof;
under § 259.35, in which to join in the appeal or prosecute a cross-appeal; under
§ 259.36, in which to file a praecipe for the record, and for a supplemental praecipe; under § 259.36(1) (c), in which to file report of proceedings and to enlarge
the time for so doing; under § 259.36(1)(d), in which to stipulate as to the
material facts in lieu of a report of proceedings; and under § 259.36(2)(a), in
which to transmit the record to the reviewing court.
5 See, for example, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.36(1) (c)and § 259.36(2) (b).
6 People v. Keller, 353 Ill.
411, 187 N.E. 460 (1933); People v. Miller, 365 Ill. 56,
5 N.E. (2d) 458 (1936).
7 Hake v. Strubel, 121 Ill.
321, 12 N.E. 676 (1887); Pieser v. Minkota Milling
Co., 222 Ill. 139, 78 N.E. 20 (1906); Richter v. C. & E. R. R. Co., 273 Ill. 625,
113 N.E. 153 (1916).
8 Ill.
Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 203, authorizes the Supreme Court to regulate
the practice and procedure by which cases shall be reviewed by general rules.
It has exercised such power insofar as the instant problem is concerned by
Rule 36, Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.36.
9 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 259.36(1)(c). Italics added.
10 Under the former practice even signing and sealing of the bill of exceptions
by the trial judge was regarded as insufficient, filing was the important factor:
Holmes v. Parker, 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 567 (1839); Hall v. Royal Neighbors of America,
231 Ill. 185, 83 N.E. 145 (1907); Illinois Improvement Co. v. Heinsen, 271 Ill. 23,
Ill N.E. 117 (1915); Williams v. DeRoo, 316 Ill. 23, 146 N.E. 470 (1925).
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period or within a proper extension thereof, the report of the proceedings
does not become a part of the record. Its contents, therefore, are not
open for consideration by the reviewing court.
W. F. ZACHARIAS
JUDGMENT--RENDITION,
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GENERAL-WHEnTHER

MORE THAN ONE JUDGMENT MAY BE RENDERED IN THE SAME CASE AGAINST
SEVERAL DEFENDANTS SUED AS JOINT TORT-FEAsos-In Shaw v. Courtney'
the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint in which he charged the several
defendants with assault and battery and also with false imprisonment.
At the ensuing trial, the issues were submitted to the jury with separate
forms of verdict as to each defendant, and the jury returned separate
verdicts as to each in varying amounts.2 On appeal from the resulting
judgments in favor of plaintiff upon such verdicts, the defendants contended the same were erroneous for lack of authority to apportion
damages against joint tort-feasors, but the court found no error on this
point by reason of Section 50 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act. 3 The cause
was, however, reversed and remanded on the ground that the several
verdicts were against the manifest weight of the evidence.
Under common law practice, the victim of a tort who believed that
several persons were responsible for the wrong, had the choice of suing
any one of the wrongdoers, or joining all as joint tort-feasors, even though
they might not have acted in concert. 4 At the trial, any defendant who
was not proven to be at fault could secure his discharge by motion for a
directed verdict. If the case went to the jury, that body might return a
verdict of not guilty as to any one or more of the defendants, but if it
found them, or some of them, guilty it would render one verdict against
all such persons for the total amount of plaintiff's damage without apportionment.5 Execution of the single judgment on such single verdict
could be enforced against any one defendant, who, upon satisfaction
thereof, was denied any right of contribution.8 If any defendant appealed
and succeeded in demonstrating error, the entire judgment was reversed as to all even though the same was compatible with right and
justice as to the others, since the same was regarded as an indivisible
unit.7 It was, of course, impossible under such practice to join several
1 317 Ill. App. 422, 46 N.E. (2d) 170 (1943).
2 The verdicts were for $5000, $1500, $1500, and $2000 respectively and separate
judgments were entered thereon, for a total of $10,000.
s Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 174.
4 Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Keifer, 134 IMI. 481, 25 N.E. 799 (1890);
Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 49 N.E. 553 (1898); City of Roodhouse
v. Christian, 55 Ill. App. 107 (1894). See also Cooley, Torts, 4th Ed., I, § 81.
5 Pecararo v. Halberg, 246 Ill. 95, 92 N.E. 600 (1910); Humason v. Michigan
Central R. Co., 259 Ill. 462, 102 N.E. 793 (1913); though plaintiff, after verdict,
might still dismiss as to any defendant and take judgment as to the remainder:
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Likes, 225 Ill. 249, 80 N.E. 136 (1907).
6 Nelson v. Cook, 17 Ill. 443 (1856).
7 McDonald v. Wilkie, 13 Ill. 22 (1851); Seymour v. Richardson Fueling Co.,
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tort-feasors except on the theory of joint liability, inasmuch as a misjoinder would have occurred had the plaintiff sought to advance several independent claims in one action against several separate defendants.
With the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, an innovation
occurred in the procedural law of this state for that statute permitted a
variety of joinder unknown to the common law.8 By reason thereof,
actions have since been upheld in which one plaintiff has been allowed
to assert several independent claims against one defendant, 9 and several
plaintiffs have been permitted to join their independent but related claims
against the same individual.' 0 In such cases, the act provides that the
court may, in its discretion, order separate trials," and further pro2
vides that more than one judgment may be rendered in the same case.'
Cases exist in which separate judgments have been rendered in favor of
independent, but joined, plaintiffs' 3 and, for purpose of jurisdiction on
review, these several judgments have been regarded just as independent
as if they had arisen in separate and distinct proceedings. 14 The practice, so far as it affects the rights of several plaintiffs, is now, therefore, fairly well settled.
The instant case, however, presents the opposite side of the picture.
There is no doubt that, had plaintiff chosen to do so, he might have
maintained a series of independent suits, one against each defendant,
holding each liable for his own conduct. 15 When the several claims were
combined in one suit against all defendants, though, a problem would
205 Ill. 77, 68 N.E. 716 (1903); Livak v. Chicago & Erie R. R. Co., 299 Ill. 218,
132 N.E. 524 (1921). It is true that Smith-Hurd Ill. Rev. Stat. 1933, Ch. 110, § 111,
repealed Jan. 1, 1934, permitted partial affirmance and partial reversal, but its
application was confined to claims clearly divisible. See Domestic Building Ass'n
v. Nelson, 172 IMI. 386, 50 N.E. 194 (1898); Village of Lee v. Harris, 206 fll. 428,
69 N.E. 230 (1903); City of Kewanee v. Puskar, 308 Ill. 167, 139 N.E. 60 (1923).
8 The joinder sections are found in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110. Section 168
thereof deals with the right of one plaintiff to advance several independent causes
against the one defendant; Section 148 covers the right of one plaintiff to name
several defendants in the alternative; and Section 147 fixes the right of several
plaintiffs to combine and assert independent but related claims against one or
more defendants. Any of the foregoing would have been impossible under
common-law rules.
9 Randall Dairy Co. v. Pevely Dairy Co., 278 Ill. App. 350 (1935), though
such case requires that the several claims be stated in separate counts in
the complaint.
10 Crane v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 293 Ill. App. 328, 12 N.E. (2d)
672 (1938); Baker v. S. A. Healy Co., 302 Ill. App. 634, 24 N.E. (2d) 228 (1939);
Weigend v. Hulsh, 315 Ill. App. 116, 42 N.E. (2d) 146 (1942).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 168.
12

Ibid., § 174.

is See, for example, Crane v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 293 Ill. App. 328,
12 N.E. (2d) 672 (1938).
14 Antosz v. Goss Motors, Inc., 378 Ill. 608, 39 N.E. (2d) 322 (1942), noted in
20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW 174.
15 Severin v. Eddy, 52 Ill. 189 (1869); W., St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Shacklet,
105 Ill. 364 (1883); City of Roodhouse v. Christian, 55 Ill. App. 107 (1894).
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arise as to the theory upon which plaintiff was pursuing his claim. If he
regarded the defendants as joint tort-feasors, 16 he should be treated as
presenting but one claim and thus be entitled to but one verdict and one
judgment against all for the whole amount of the damage sustained. 1
Such, at least, would have been the rule in this state prior to the adoption
of the Civil Practice Act, and such has been the holding in New Jersey,
from which state a portion of the pertinent statutory section appears to
have been drawn,' 8 as well as in England under the reformed procedure
adopted there. 19 Decisions exist in other jurisdictions with apparently
contrary holdings, 20 but such cases appear to be predicated on the fact
that, in them, certain of the joined defendants were found to be subject
to liability for punitive damages, hence it was regarded as proper to take
separate verdicts against them for the purpose of ascertaining the
21
amount of such additional penalty.
If, on the other hand, the theory of the plaintiff's case, as disclosed
by the pleadings, is that he is pursuing his independent claims against
the several defendants but has joined them in one action for convenience
of proof, then the statute specifically sanctions the use of separate verdicts 22 and separate judgments, 23 just as it authorizes that such actions
may be severed or consolidated as an aid to convenience. 24 In such a
16 This theory is more apt to be indicated by a single-count complaint in
which the allegations are not in the alternative.
17 Such, at least, was the practice followed in Wiedow v. Ellen Alden Carpenter, 310 Ill. App. 342, 34 N.E. (2d) 83 (1941), where, in a suit under the Dram
Shop Act, one verdict and one judgment was taken against the owner of the
premises, the proprietor of the dram shop, and the actual assailant.
18 In Walder v. Manahan, 21 N. J. Misc. 1, 29 A. (2d) 395 (1942), a verdict
which found ".

.

. against the defendants in the sum of $20,000; $10,000 against

each defendant," was held improper as an attempt to apportion damages
between joint tort-feasors. See also Owens v. Cerullo, 9 N. J. Misc. 776, 155 A.
759 (1931); Tricoli v. Centalanza, 100 N. J. Law 231, 126 A. 214 (1924). In LaBella
v. Brown, and LaBella v. Derr, 103 N. J. Law 491, 133 A. 82 (1926), it was
regarded as error to consolidate two separate suits for purpose of trial and to
accept a single verdict therein followed by a single judgment thereon, when,
in fact, the two claims were against truly independent tort-feasors though
affecting the same victim.
19 Greenlands, Ltd. v. Wilmshurst, (1913) 3 K.B. 507, particularly 530, reversed on other grounds in (1916) 2 A. C. 15.
20 The court in the instant case cited and relied on Latasa v. Aron, 109
N.Y.S. 744 (1908); Edquest v. Tripp & Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont. 446, 19 P. (2d)
637 (1933); McCurdy v. Hughes, 63 N.D. 435, 248 N.W. 512 (1933); Johnson v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 142 S. C. 125, 140 S.E. 443 (1927); Mauk v. Brundage,
68 Ohio St. 89, 67 N.E. 152 (1903); Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Roth, 130 Ky. 759,
114 S.W. 264 (1908); and Waggoner v. Wyatt, 43 Tex. Civ. App. 75, 94 S.W. 1076
(1906). In all such cases the discrepancy in the verdicts was purely on the
question of punitive damages. Some of the jurisdictions in question either require
or permit the use of separate verdicts or separate specification as between compensatory and punitive damages, even where only one defendant is involved.
21 As to the rule in Illinois on this point, see Becker v. Dupree, 75 Ill. 167 (1874).
22 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1941, Ch. 110, § 192(2).
23 Ibid., § 174.
24 Ibid., § 175.
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case it should be expected that the rule would be the same whether the
case involved the rights of several independent plaintiffs or concerned
25
the liabilities of several independent defendants.
The latter view represents the one taken by the court in the instant
case, but the pleadings utilized would seem to indicate that the plaintiff's
theory of his case was one for recovery against joint tort-feasors. 26 While
it is true that a plaintiff may chose whether to sue on one or the other
theory, he should not be permitted to disregard them, for upon such
choice should depend the basis for a proper application of the rules of
procedure as they relate to the taking of separate verdicts and the rendition of separate judgments.

W. F.

ZACHArrIs

25 Such, at least, was the view of the late Professor Hinton who wrote: "One
rather striking change that it [Section 50 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act]
makes is in allowing a number of judgments in the same case, the ordinary
common-law rule being that one judgment disposed of the entire case." Hinton,
Illinois Civil Practice Act Lectures, p. 276. He was, however, careful to preface

this statement with the remark that: ".

.

. I think it must be limited to those

cases of plaintiffs having several rights and defendants under several liabilities.
I don't think it could be construed to upset our whole law involved in joint rights
and purely joint liabilities." Ibid., p. 275. (Italics added.)
26 In Koltz v. Jahaaske, 312 Ill. App. 623, 38 N.E. (2d) 973 (1942), an action
definitely predicated against two defendants on the theory of a joint tort, separate
verdicts were taken but the court found no prejudicial error since the irregularity
had been cured by a remittitur as to one of the defendants. The practice of
taking separate verdicts, was, however, condemned on the authority of St. Louis,
Alton, etc., R. R. Co. v. South, 43 Ill.
176 (1867).

